The Federal Government and Justice
The Federalist Papers, #51
James Madison
In a free government the security for civil rights must
be the same as that for religious rights. It consists
in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and
in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree
of security in both cases will depend on the number of
interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend
on the extent of country and number of people
comprehended under the same government.
This view of the subject must particularly recommend a
proper federal system to all the sincere and
considerate friends of republican government, since it
shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the
Union may be formed into more circumscribed
Confederacies, or States, oppressive combinations of a
majority will be facilitated; the best security, under
the republican forms, for the rights of every class of
citizens, will be diminished; and consequently the
stability and independence of some member of the
government, the only other security, must be
proportionally increased. Justice is the end of
government. It is the end of civil society. It ever
has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained,
or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.
In a society under the forms of which the stronger
faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker,
anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of
nature, where the weaker individual is not secured
against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the
latter state, even the stronger individuals are
prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to
submit to a government which may protect the weak as
well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the
more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced,
by a like motive, to wish for a government which will
protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more
powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State
of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and
left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the
popular form of government within such narrow limits
would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of
factious majorities that some power altogether
independent of the people would soon be called for by
the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved
the necessity of it.
In the extended republic of the United States, and
among the great variety of interests, parties, and
sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of
the whole society could seldom take place on any other
principles than those of justice and the general good;
whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the
will of a major party, there must be less pretext,
also, to provide for the security of the former, by
introducing into the government a will not dependent on
the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of
the society itself.
It is no less certain than it is important,
notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been
entertained, that the larger the society, provided it
lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it
will be of self-government. And happily for the
republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried
to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and
mixture of the federal principle.